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Introduction
Assessing the economic impact of public science has been discussed among economic scholars, professionals and policy makers since decades. The most obvious contribution of public science towards economic growth is the education of the future high-skilled labor force. Possibly equally important, however, is the fact that public science provides research results for the public domain, and their insights can be picked up by the business sector so that research results from public institutions can be translated into new production processes and products. Third, more active ways to promote the knowledge and technology transfer from academe to industry are, among other channels, collaborations in R&D projects, faculty consulting, spin-off creation by universities, university patenting and licensing of technologies. Those activities are typically summarized as industry-science interactions.
Several scholars have shown positive economic benefits of research results produced in public science. For instance, Jaffe (1989) has shown that university research contributes to state-level corporate patenting. Adams (1990) found that cumulative stocks of academic research stimulate productivity growth in industry. Lichtenberg (1996, 2001, 2003) links pharmaceutical innovation to lower hospital costs and increased life expectancy, and Toole (2007) concludes that university research makes significant contribution to drug innovation in pharmaceutical industry. Mansfield (1991) concludes from a survey of 76 US firms that 11% of product inventions and 9% of process inventions would not have been made in the absence of recent academic research. This picture is supported by the Yale survey and the Carnegy Mellon survey. Both surveys have shown that universities deliver a significant impact for new product and process development in firms (Cohen et al., 2002) . Further studies have shown that academic scientists significantly contributed to the birth of the U.S. biotechnology industry Darby, 1996, Zucker et al., 1998) , and that academic scientists significantly contribute to firm performance when they venture from academe to industry (Zucker et al., 2002 , Toole and Czarnitzki, 2007 , 2008 .
On the background of the ongoing transformation of economies towards "modern knowledge societies", many governments increased their attention towards industryscience interactions, and, hence, those have been the subject of innovation policy in most industrialized countries recently. Such policies aim at increasing industryscience interactions in the future as it is assumed that an increased attitude towards commercialization in public science will result in even higher economic benefits.
Despite the presumably positive effect of increased commercialization of academic inventions on technological progress, there are some serious threats. Most important is the peril of the "culture of open science" at universities through a shift in content of academic research from basic to applied research that focuses on subsequent commercialization (Verspagen, 2006) . Many scholars see the relatively open nature of science progress at universities, which is characterized by sharing of knowledge, data and research results as opposed to corporate research and development, as a key determinant of the success of university research (Dasgupta and David, 1994) .
These controversial arguments gave rise to several studies on the commercialization of academic research in response to policy changes. Among other policies, the most prominent or most studied example is the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act from 1980. The BayhDole Act strengthened the patenting rights of US universities (and small businesses) by granting them the right to patent and to retain the ownership of inventions even if these were financed through public resources. Examples of studies on the potential effects of the Bayh-Dole Act are Henderson et al. (1998) , , , and Sampat et al. (2003) .
While most of the literature on the quality of academic commercialization is based on the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S., little attention has been paid to the commercial value of science more generally. We exploit institutional differences between the U.S. and Europe, and suggest that even without a Bayh-Dole Act, the increasing orientation towards commercialization results in diminishing quality of academic commercialization. We argue that declining public budgets for Higher Education R&D and increased policy orientation towards technology transfer result in more industry-science interactions. However, as can be expected from neoclassical theory, more commercialization activities are subject to decreasing marginal returns.
We use patent data on German professors as we are able to identify individual academic inventors. Unlike most other studies for the U.S., we do not rely on assigneeship of a university, as academics may also collaborate with industry without university involvement. Our results show that "professor patents" are, on average, more valuable than a corporate patent without faculty involvement. However, we observe a stark decline of quality over time. First, the quality of corporate and academic patents converge, but in the most recent period in our data, academic quality even falls behind corporate quality. Interestingly, this last period corresponds to the introduction of a Bayh-Dole-type policy in Germany. In further steps, we show that academic entrants that enter commercialization channels possibly due to budget constraints in the public sector account for a larger share of the decline than do experienced inventors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first we outline the literature and our hypotheses to be tested. The third section presents the construction of the database, and some descriptive evidence. Section 4 presents econometric evidence from count data models. The final section concludes and suggests further research on the topic.
Commercializing Academic Research

The difference between public and private research
Public sector science in form of discoveries and inventions produced at universities or other public research institutions has some features that distinguish it from research financed and produced in the business sector. Typically, public knowledge production happens in an open regime that facilitates disclosure and diffusion of inventions and discoveries (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . Science has priority over commercialization of inventions and the incentives for inventors are significantly determined by peer recognition and career rewards such as tenure, and not only by monetary rewards (Merton, 1973) .
1 This incentive structure strongly supports the openness of public science and leverages effective cumulative innovation through a sharing of knowledge, data and research results. In contrast, science produced in the private sector aims at commercialization and the profit from an invention largely depends on the degree to which others can be excluded (Arrow, 1962) .
As the focus of private science is often on short and medium-term profits from inventions, the private sector is likely to systematically "underfund" inventions that are rather basic in nature (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) . As opposed to applied inventions that are strongly linked to their commercial success basic inventions and the results of fundamental research are more difficult to appropriate, especially in the short run. This is one of the main arguments for publicly sponsored science. A systematic difference in the nature of public and private science has been empirically approved (Trajtenberg et al., 1997) . A related argument for public science is that fundamental research might have much broader applications, i.e. their social value should be higher than that of private science. Hence, the "shoulders" of inventions and discoveries produced at universities are supposed to be much broader than those of private inventions. Beyond break-through inventions and industry-science collaborations, publicly sponsored science at universities provides codified ways of solving problems that can be useful beyond a specific content and universities borders (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . Further, public science provides a structured picture of interdependencies in science, which can help uncovering the relevant technology areas of a particular problem. This can save research efforts as it can help avoiding unnecessary (costly and time consuming) experiments and maximize the probability of discovery (Fleming and Sorensen, 2004) .
These distinctive features of public science suggest a significant contribution to technological progress and growth: the basicness of university science increases the potential for its use and the open culture at universities positively affects the diffusion of research results. Griliches (1984) and Adams (1990) document a significant contribution of university research and science produced at public research centres to economic growth in their seminal studies.
On top of that there are arguments that support that the knowledge produced in the public science sector should even exceed private sector knowledge. For instance, in order to justify publicly financed science, we should see that discoveries made in the public sector have a higher social value than inventions produced by the private sector (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) .
What happens if academic scientists engage in commercialization, though? While we expect that academic inventions will be socially more valuable, it does not necessarily imply that the private value is also high. However, in the case of spin-off creation or patenting, for example, we can follow the logic of a theoretical model of Lacetera (2008) . Suppose an industrial research and an academic scientist face the same time constraint for their activity (e.g. 12 working hours per day), and suppose both have certain ideas for research projects. The industrial researcher would start a project if the expected profits are larger than zero. The academic scientist, however, has to decide to which extent he or she splits the time between academic tasks, e.g. publications, and commercial tasks. Thus, the academic has opportunity cost of foregone academic merits if he or she decides to engage in commercialization. The academic scientist would only self-select into commercialization if the expected utility gain, that is, monetary profits, is larger than the lost utility of non-published papers due to time constraints. Hence, we can still conclude that academic patents, for instance, should be more valuable than private sector patents due to the incurred positive opportunity cost for the academic scientist which induces a self-selection into commercialization.
2
Taking these different arguments together, we arrive at a first hypothesis which will be tested with patent data:
• Hypothesis 1:
Faculty involvement in the commercialization of inventions should, on average, lead to higher quality than inventions produced by non-academics.
Furthermore, we will also test if academic inventors are more likely to produce breakthrough inventions. While one expects that the average quality is higher, it can also be expected that block-buster patents are produced in academe, as they may require highly complex processes and approaches. Academics who are usually assumed to be at the forefront of research in their field may have a comparative advantage over industrial researchers, as they, for instance, shape their human capital within a small group of initial discoverers of new technology field. See Zucker et al. (1998) for the example of academic discoveries in the biotechnology sector and how their commercialization activities linked to a few star scientists led to a diffusion of knowledge that is nowadays commonly used in the U.S. or to a large extent even in the global biotechnology industry.
• Hypothesis 2:
Faculty involvement in the commercialization of inventions does not only lead to higher quality, on average, but faculty patents are especially more valuable in the upper tail of the quality distribution of inventions.
Public budgets and implications for public research
The recent past has seen significant changes in the European public science sector.
First of all, public budgets spent on science and technology decreased significantly all over Europe . Figure 1 Furthermore, in the presence of public budget constraints the structure of public financing of research changed towards competitive funds (Geuna, 2001) . Examples are the "elite university" in Germany, where universities compete against each other for "elite" funding by the government.
The decreasing public funding forced universities to more and more reach out for different sources of financing . Besides an increased financing by non-profit organizations, most of the funding gap was bridged through increased collaborations with the private sector (Geuna, 2001) . The increased dependence on industry funds might have significant consequences for academic research. On the one hand, close links between academia and industry have many positive aspects not only for the business partner (e.g. Darby, 2000, Hall et al., 2001 ) but also for the academic sector, as for instance the realization of complementarities between applied and basic research (Azoulay et al., 2006) and the generation of new research ideas (Rosenberg, 1998) . However, there are also some potential negative implications. Most serious, the content of academic research might shift from rather basic to applied inventions that aim at immediate commercialization (Azoulay et al., 2006) , which would have negative implications for long-term fundamental research. A shift in content towards commercialization would partly explain the increased engagement of academics in patenting that was documented by a number of scholars for different European countries (Meyer et al., 2003 , Czarnitzki et al., 2007a , 2007b . However, scientists face an increasing pressure to patent from changing rules in the public science sector. The competition for funding from the government is not based on scientific publications only but also evaluates the scientists or the university department in terms of their patent outcome. Furthermore, career rewards as tenure are increasingly dependent on patents and industry-science collaboration rather than on scientific publications only. These developments gradually changed the incentive structure for scientists and put them under increased pressure to transfer their knowledge into marketable products.
3 Another important threat concerns the number and the quality of scientific publications. Geuna and Nesta (2006) survey the existing literature for Europe on the effect of increased patenting on publication outcome. Most of the studies for Europe find no empirical evidence for university patenting to reduce the number of scientific publications or their quality (e.g. Czarnitzki et al. 2007a , for Germany, Breschi et al., 2006 . For the US, the results are similar (e.g. Stephan et al., 2006 , Azoulay et al., 2006 , Fabrizio and DiMinin, 2005 . Distinguishing between university and corporate patents of professors in Germany, Czarnitzki et al. (2007b) conclude that corporate patenting by academics has a negative impact on their scientific performance, while patents in collaboration with nor-profit organizations spur their publication outcome and quality .
Extending Lacetera's (2008) and Jensen et al.'s (2007) arguments, suppose that an academic scientist has the opportunity to complete either an economically valuable project or to do basic science in each of two periods. The scientist can do precommercial research in the first period and use this new knowledge to engage in commercial activity in the second period. Alternatively, the scientist can engage in commercial activity right away, building on his current stock of knowledge solely. In the first scenario, the scientist applies his new research results to innovate. In the second scenario, the scientist will innovate, based on the current state of knowledge.
Therefore, the quality of these innovations will differ substantially, as the innovation based on novel scientific achievements will have a higher value than the innovation based on existing knowledge. Due to the increased pressure to patent they face, scientists will therefore be more likely to shift toward immediate commercialization without performing pre-commercial research, which will result in innovations of lower quality.
In addition, incentives for the corporate sector to collaborate with academia have also evolved. Many European governments, as well as the European Commission, have launched several public programs to promote and strengthen industry-science links, by financially supporting collaboration between academia and the private sector (Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005) . There is ample evidence that these financial incentives increase the propensity of firms of engaging in cooperative agreements with academia in order to benefit from government-sponsored cost sharing of innovation (Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005 , Capron and Cincera, 2003 , Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003 . only firms only science firms+science However, cooperation with academia requires a critical level of prior knowledge or "absorptive capacity" (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) to effectively recognize, assimilate and utilize external information flows stemming from academia, which are by nature more basic. This suggests that the growing public support of cooperative agreements between the private sector and academia led many firms that do not have this critical level of internal knowledge to engage in partnerships with academia.
Thus, we arrive at our third hypothesis on a possible decline of patent quality.
• Hypothesis 3:
The quality of faculty patents declines with the increasing shift towards commercialization in academe (compared to a control group of corporate patents). Mowery et al. (2006) find that in the US, inexperienced universities initially adopted an indiscriminate policy toward patenting as they entered into this activity after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and patented inventions with little evaluation of the market within their industry. Furthermore, they find that the decline quality of university patents in the U.S. is largely due to these academic entrants. Provided Hypothesis 3 is fulfilled, the decline in quality of faculty patents might as well be driven by academic entrants. Therefore we will test whether the decrease in quality of faculty patents should be attributed to academics with no historical experience in patenting, or if there is a more secular decline.
We argue that even if academic entrants patent inventions of lower importance than academic incumbents, they are not causing the decline, since the new "research culture" induced by the changing objectives and funding sources affect all potential academic inventor.
• Hypothesis 4:
Academic entrants have patents of lower quality than academic incumbents, but they do not drive the decline in quality.
The abolishment of the professor's privilege in Germany
As outlined above, the shift to entrepreneurial universities (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) may reduce the difference between academic and industrial research due to an orientation towards commercialization in public science. Studies for the U.S. that have investigated the consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act find mixed evidence on this hypothesis (among others, Henderson et al., 1998 , and Sampat et al., 2003 . Researchers have studied patent quality before and after the Act in 1980. However, the after-Bayh-Dole Act phase was also characterized by a general trend towards the entrepreneurial university in the U.S.
that cannot be purely attributed to strengthening universities' patent rights. For instance, it can also be observed that the number of spin-off companies is constantly growing in the U. We make use of institutional differences between the U.S. and Germany to uncover differences of the generally increasing commercialization trend and the impact of a Bayh-Dole Act-type policy change in February 2002. Until then, German universities had a weak position in terms of their rights to use the inventions of their employees.
The "professors' privilege" determined that professors were the only occupational group in Germany that had the right to use their scientific results for private commercialization even if the underlying research was financed by the university.
This explains why the majority of inventions (that were taken out as patents) made in German universities were not assigned to universities but to the professors themselves or to corporations (Verspagen, 2006 , Czarnitzki et al., 2007a .
Once derived from Article 5 of the German constitution, which pertains to the freedom of science and research, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) decided to abandon the professor's privilege in 2002 because it was suspected to inhibit science and technology transfer (Kilger and Bartenbach, 2002) . Under the old law, the professor bore all the financial risk of filing a patent application (including patent application fees and potential infringement costs). As the distribution of the value of patents is known to be very skew university professors faced the risk that the costs of patenting would increase the profits thereof by far, which significantly decreased their incentives to patent. Under the new law, the university takes over the financial risk and the patent application procedure and the professor receives 30% of the revenues from exploiting his invention. Hence, the threshold for professors to patent is even reduced as the opportunity cost of patenting were decreased through the abolishment of the "professor's privilege" in 2002.
We expect that the abolishment of the "professor's privilege" will have two effects: for one, the number of patents assigned to universities is expected to increase. Second, we suspect a decline in quality of patents taken out by professors. As a result of the change in law the self selection effect into commercial activities that resulted in higher quality of academic patents is supposed to be significantly reduced. Hence, a potential decline of patent quality due to an increasing commercial orientation in academe is expected to be accelerated trough the change in law, i.e. after 2002. The investigation of the effect of the abolishment of the professors' privilege should, however, be taken cautiously, since we only observe academic patents for a short period after the law change. Our results should be taken as indicative of the effect that the abolishment of the Professors' privilege had in the short run, but should not be taken as a definitive evaluation.
3
Data and Methodology
Data and sample selection
Our analysis is based on a dataset issued by the European Patent Office (EPO) and the OECD. The "EPO/OECD patent citations database" covers all patents applied for at the EPO since its foundation in 1978 and up to October 2006 as well as all patents applied for under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in which the EPO is designated, so-called "Euro-PCT applications". In addition to detailed information on all cited patents, the dataset contains other information for each patent (technology classes, date of application and title) and each applicant and inventor (name and place of residence). An earlier version of this database is fully described and analyzed in Webb et al. (2005) .
From this database we extracted all applications involving at least one inventor residing in Germany, resulting in a total of 346,892 patent applications. We identified all patents invented by German Professors by using the persons' title "Prof. patents owned by universities), roughly 0.45% of the total of academic patents.
To further check the completeness of our sample of academic patents, we compared the outcome with a similar search in the data from the German Patent and Trademark
Office (GPTO). More precisely, we searched all patents that have an EPO equivalent at the GPTO and that list professors as inventors. We found only 112 cases in which the GPTO patent listed a professor, but not the equivalent EPO patent over the period
1990-2001.
In order to evaluate the "importance" of our "academic patents", we constructed a control group that include one non-academic patent for each academic patent. The non-academic patents were randomly drawn based on the date of applications and on 30 patent technology classes as defined in the OST-INPI/FhG-ISI classification also often referred to as the Fraunhofer classification, which is based on a concordance with IPC assignments. For a detailed description see OECD (1994, p.77-78 for the definition).
In order to ensure that no academic patent would end up in our control group, we deleted patents granted to non-German universities and public non-university research institutions 4 from the pool of non-academic patents. In total, 6,758 patents were taken out of the pool from which the control group was drawn.
Variables
We use the number of citations received by a focal patent from any subsequent patent application in order to establish potential differences between academic patents and the control group. Our purpose in this paper is to evaluate the involvement of academics in terms of the quality of patents. In particular, we want to know whether applications involving academic inventors have a stronger technological impact, and are therefore more frequently cited. Patent forward citations are a well established measure for the "importance", the "quality" or the "significance" of a patented invention and have been used in different contexts in the literature on technological change (see Trajtenberg, 1990 , Henderson et al., 1998 , Harhoff et al., 1999 , Trajtenberg, 2001 . Previous studies have shown that forward citations are highly correlated with the social value of the patented invention (Trajtenberg, 1990 , for the computer tomography industry) as well as with its private value (Harhoff et al., 1999 . Furthermore, forward citations reflect the economic and technological "importance" as perceived by the inventors themselves (Jaffe et al., 2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology field (Albert et al., 1991) . In this paper we use citation data from the EPO that has been made recently available in machine readable format by the EPO and the OECD. The high correlation between the number of forward citations to EPO patents with patent value has been documented by Gambardella et al. (2008) . Hence, we can safely argue that forward citations reflect the "importance" of the cited patent.
Previous U.S. studies on patent citations paid particular attention to "self-citations", i.e. cited and citing patents are owned by the same entity (e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002) . Self-citations differ from external citations in that they cannot be regarded as representing spillovers to another patentee, they might be affected by the patentee's differential knowledge and they might provide different signals than other citations regarding the value to the patentee with respect to future cumulative inventions . Contrary to the well-known "NBER Patent Database", the "EPO/OECD patent citations database" does not indicate self-citations. Hence, we cannot control for them. However, we do not expect any significant impact on the results from self-citations for two reasons. First, previous studies have found little effects from the exclusion of self-citation on forward citations in different contexts. , for instance, found a real but limited effect of the exclusion of self-citation on the relationship between forward citations and the market value of firms for U.S. patents (see also Hall et al., 2007) . For Europe, Sapsalis and Van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) found that removing self-citations does not affect the relationship between forward citations and the explanatory variables for EPO patents of Belgian universities. Second, unlike at the USPTO, patent applicants at the EPO do not have the "duty of candor", which means that there is no legal requirement to disclose prior art. In order to check whether an EPO patent application fulfills the necessary criteria to be granted, a patent examiner researches prior. The results of this investigation are summarized in the so-called "search report". Descriptive statistics
show that more than 95% of the citations in EPO patents are added by the examiner.
In contrast, USPTO applicants have to provide a full list of prior art, including their own work. This suggests that the "self-bias" in EPO patents is presumably very low and would carry a weak informational content. The fact that the allocation of citations follows a standardized procedure at the EPO is likely to reduce the noise contained in the forward citations as a measure of the "importance" of patents.
Turning to the explanatory variables of our analysis, our main variable is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 if the inventor is an academic (see description in section 3.1). We will test whether patents that involve academic inventors are more "important" than those of the controls.
Following the literature on patent quality, intrinsic attributes of the patent that may lead to a higher expected count of forward citations need to be controlled for.
Consequently, we include the following control variables:
Number of references to the patent literature (backward citations): The search report published by the EPO yields information on the state of the art relevant for a given patent application. Backward citations determine the legal boundaries of an invention by citing a related body of work. Thus, one could hypothesize that applications containing references to a large number of related inventions are of more incremental nature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001 ). However, empirical evidence tends to uncover a positive effect of backward citations on the value of a patent (Harhoff et al., 2003) , which suggests that the number of cited patent is more likely to refer to the crowdedness of the technological area (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001 ). Everything else equal, patents in more crowded areas should generate more forward citations. An alternative interpretation is that backward citations are a measure of the scope of the patents. Since patent citations always refer to a claim (or a set of claims), patents with more backward citations should be more cited, everything else equal (Harhoff et al., 2003) .
Patent scope: Following Lerner (1994) , we use the number of international patent classes (IPC), at the 4-digit level, assigned to the patent as a measure of patent scope.
The number of IPC assignments is a proxy for the extent of monopoly power a patent grants. Thus the broader the scope of a patent, the higher the probability to be cited by other patents.
References to the non-patent literature:
We include a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the patent application cites at least one non-patent reference (NPR). We hypothesize that NPRs capture the invention's science linkage. This measure should be taken cautiously, since NPRs do not necessarily represent a linkage to prior scientific work (Harhoff et al., 2003) . 5 However, Callaert et al. (2004) show that roughly 65% of NPRs in EPO patents refer to scientific publications and there is some recognition of their use as an indicator of science-technology linkages (Meyer, 2000 , Schmoch, 1997 .
Finally, we control for systematic year and technology effects by including dummies for application years and technology fields (see below). Table 2 tabulates the number of academic patents in each of the technology areas from the OST classification. The Table shows that most academic patents are granted in chemicals and pharmaceuticals, which contains more than 40% of all academic patents, notably in the field of organic fine chemicals.
Descriptive analysis
Summary statistics
Citation lags
Forward citations are by nature truncated, since earlier patents have more time to garner citations than later ones ). Sampat et al. (2003) compare university and corporate patents in the U.S. and find that the resulting difference in citation counts is sensitive to the length of the time period taken into account. They argue that citations to universities occur on average later than citations to the controls.
We test the hypothesis of different citation lags between academic patents and the control group by plotting the kernel density of the citation lag distribution for both groups. Figure 2 reveals that there are no systematic differences between academic patents and the controls. Moreover, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject equality of the citation lag distributions (p-value: 0.678). Hence, we can safely argue that our empirical findings are not driven by systematic differences in citation lags for academic and control patents. The finding that there is no significant difference in citation lags for European patents might be due to different procedures at the EPO and USPTO. As pointed out in section 3.2 already, contrary to practices at the USPTO, inventors applying for an EPO patent do not have the "duty of candor" and are not required to provide a list of prior art. The patent application is examined by the patent office and even references made by the applicant have to be approved by the patent examiner. Bacchiocchi and Montobbio (2004) find that these institutional differences imply that USPTO patents contain on average more citations than EPO patents and that the median citation lag is twice as large at the USPTO than at the EPO. [ ]
where C is the number of forward citations to the focal patent and X is the vector of explanatory variables containing: ACAD, a dummy that equals 1 for all academic patents in our sample; APY, a set of dummy variables for different patent application years t, and TECH, a set of dummy variables for the different technology classes c a patent application is attributed to. In addition, the vector Z contains the control variables outlined in Section 3.2. The dependent variable, the number of forward citations, is truncated since later patents have less time to garner citations than earlier ones, which is why we estimate the model with "exposure" (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . The variable T is the age of the patent in 2006 (the last year recorded in our data) since its publication, or exposure during which citations occur. Thus, the natural by Quasi-Maximum Likelihood, since estimates of this model will be consistent, provided the mean is correctly specified, even if the true distribution is not Poisson (Gouriéroux et al., 1984) . However, it is possible to improve efficiency by making more restrictive assumptions about the way the variance differs from the mean, which is why we also report results of Negative Binomial regressions.
Two robustness checks are reported in the Appendix. First, we repeat all regressions using only those academic patents that involve corporate assignees. We also repeat all regressions using all academic patent applications (instead of granted patents only).
This enables us to verify that our data is not affected by the end of the sample truncation in patent grants. Sampat et al. (2003) show that U.S. university patents are on average granted later than corporate patents. Since the results of the estimations in which we use all patent applications go into the same direction as the results from our baseline sample, we argue that this problem is not severe for European patents. Table 3 This suggests that university patenting per se is not the only channel through which academics can generate knowledge externalities. Overall, the results support our assumption that academic patents are, on average, more "important" than purely corporate patents.
Results
Are academic patents more "important" than corporate patents?
With respect to the control variables, our results show that, everything else equal, applications with more backward citations receive, on average, more citations. In the same way, broader applications, as measured by the number of IPC assignments (at the 4-digit level), show a higher expected citations count. Finally, NPRs do not exhibit a higher citation impact in the Poisson model, but turn out to be positively and significantly related to the number of citations received in the Negative Binomial model. 
Are academic patents more "important" in the upper tail of the quality distribution of inventions?
In order to test our second hypothesis we estimate quantile regressions. For simplicity we use a log-linear specification instead of count models, where the dependent variable is the log of (one plus) the number of forward citations. Figure 4 shown from the 50 th quantile since there are more than 30% of patents with no citation, so that the coefficient for the academic dummy would always be zero at lower quantiles.
We find that, academic patents have a quite uniform effect over the whole range of the distribution. Thus, the quantile regressions are quite consistent with the OLS results, since their coefficient is always contained in the OLS confidence interval.
Therefore, we do not confirm our second hypothesis. The results suggest that academics are not more likely to be found in the upper tail of the quality distribution of patented inventions. 
Did the "quality" of academic patents decline over time?
Given the changing conditions for academics in terms of research agendas, funding sources, as well as legal structures, we test whether the "quality" of academic patents has evolved over time. To do so, we repeat the baseline regression by interacting the application years with the "academic patent" dummy. The estimated model becomes:
The results are reported in Table 4 . The signs and magnitude of the interaction terms suggest that the quality of academic and corporate patents tends to converge over time, which supports our hypothesis 3 of greater pressure put on faculty members to patent, leading to academic patents of lower "importance". The results reveal a decreasing trend in academic patent quality, even without a Bayh-Dole act type of legislation.
Interestingly, the interaction terms of application years and the academic inventor dummy becomes negative and significant after 2001, which corresponds to the period of the abolishment of the "professor privilege". These preliminary estimations suggest that the law change has accelerated the decline in "importance" of academic patents, confirming hypothesis 4; however, we are not able to assess the long-term impact of this policy change for two reasons. First, in order to effectively assess the effect of this new measure, we would need to perform the analysis using a longer time window of the citations. The current result only includes data for two years after the policy change entered into play and we only have three years of citations data for the latest period in our sample. Second, it is not clear whether universities already started to enforce this policy since we only observe four patents granted to universities in the post 2002 period. The present results are therefore only indicative of a negative relationship in the short run. Moreover, as demonstrated by Mowery et al. (2003) , universities (and academics) can learn to patent, through experience in patenting and therefore our results might well be different in the long run, once universities start to enforce the new policy by claiming ownership of the patents and establishing efficient technology transfer offices, which does not seem to be the case so far. (p-value) 0.000 Log-likelihood -25408.794 -19958.754 4.4 Is the decline driven by academic entry? Mowery et al. (2006) find that in the U.S., inexperienced universities initially adopted an indiscriminate policy toward patenting as they entered into this activity after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and patented inventions with little evaluation of the market within their industry. Furthermore, they find that the decline quality of university patents in the U.S. is largely due to these academic entrants. In order to complement our previous findings we test whether the decline in the quality of faculty patents can be attributed to academics with no historical experience in patenting.
The estimated model becomes: We are going to use these three time windows in order to identify whether entry of new academic inventors played a role in this apparent decline in quality of academic patents.
The results in Table 5 The results of formal tests for the relative performance of academic entrants and incumbents are presented in Table 6 . One-sided χ 2 -tests for the null hypothesis γ ω ≥ reveal that academic entrants always performed worse than incumbents. However, our previous finding on the decline in quality still holds for academic incumbents, even when controlling for academic entry. This suggests that academic entrants are not causing the decline but that seems to be more secular. 
Conclusion
As a major source of knowledge creation the public science sector and universities in particular have attracted considerable attention by policy makers and economic scholars in the recent past. Their main interest is to access the full potential of science and knowledge produces at universities (and other public science institutions) and to identify and facilitate effective ways to improve exploitation of these inventions for the benefit of the economy. In consequence, recent policy endeavors aimed at enhancing knowledge transfer from science to industry. Most prominent and also most significant actions taken by governments of industrialized countries were BayhDole act type of legislation changes to strengthen universities' patenting rights.
Addressing the importance of university inventions as opposed to business inventions previous studies focused on patents as a way to make inventions and their importance (in terms of citations they receive) visible. It is found that university patents outperform patents in the business sector in terms of citations they receive (e.g. Henderson et al., 1998) . Not all inventions by university professors are, however, patented through the university . The present paper takes an initial step in focusing on the whole landscape of inventions taken out by academic scientists independent of assigneeship on patent documents. By comparing patents with at least one academic on the inventor list to a control group of pure business patents we find that academic involvement in patenting results in greater knowledge externalities as measured by forward citations. Hence, our results confirm the findings by previous studies that focus on university patents only. However, our analysis also suggests that the contribution of academics is underestimated if only patents assigned to universities are taken into account. Indeed, a major channel of knowledge transfer from science to business takes place through consulting and other forms of collaborative research in between academics and firms that become visible in coinvented patents assigned to the private sector. Taking these patents into account is especially important for Europe where Bayh-Dole act type of legislations took place only recently in many countries, which implies that universities claim the right on academics' inventions only in recent years.
Further, we find that in the European context of changing public sector research environments and increasingly competitive funding sources, the "importance" of academic patents declines over time since the mid-90's. This is partly due to inexperienced academics that engage in patenting without any thorough evaluation of the relevant market as is suggested by the low number of citations their patents receive. However, also the relative importance of patents involving experienced academics declined over time. Hence, the quality of corporate and academic patents converge and in the most recent period in our data, academic quality even falls behind corporate quality. This last period corresponds to the introduction of a Bayh-Doletype policy in Germany, which suggests that this legal disposition led to an acceleration of the patent quality decline. The latter result has to be taken with caution though as it only maps the effects in the immediate years after the abolishment of the professors' privilege and might be a transitory effect.
These results have some interesting implications. In showing that academic and business patents converge over the past decades in terms of importance we find a similar pattern as has been found for the U.S. (e.g. Henderson et al., 1998) . The relative quality decline of university patents in the U.S. is typically attributed at least in part to the Bayh-Dole act that led university to increased patenting, though. The fact that we observe the same development for Germany, where the "German BayhDole act" took only place recently, suggests, however, that the convergence between academic and business patents is rather attributable to a reorientation of the public science sector towards marketable research projects, funding sources in the private sector and through industry-science collaborations. Table 2a repeats the regression made in Table 2 . The results are consistent with those discussed in the text and the coefficient for the academic dummy is close to the one previously found. Table 4a repeats the regression from Table 4 by interacting the academic dummy with year dummies. The results are again consistent with those from our baseline sample and exhibit the same trend. The quantile regression gives identical results as the ones found in the text, as the coefficient for the academic dummy remains within the boundaries of the OLS confidence interval. B. All patent applications.
In this Section, we repeat all regressions made in the text using all patent applications instead of the granted ones only, and by constructing an adequate control group as before. Descriptive statistics for the new sample are provided in Table 1b . Table 2b shows that the coefficient on the academic dummy is slightly lower, as can be expected, when we take all applications into account. However, the effect is still positive and significant. The quantile regression gives the same results as before, i.e., the academic dummy remains within the boundaries of the OLS confidence interval. Finally, the results reported in Table 5b confirm our previous findings concerning the decline of quality for academic entrants and incumbents. 
